Keywords
Social Responsibility
Corporate Governance
Agency Theory
How to Cite
Abstract
Objective: Corruption, seen as the abuse or misuse of power or trust for one's benefit instead of the purpose for which that power or trust was granted, has caused problems for many countries and the principles of Social Responsibility through the models of Carroll and Schwartz and Corporate Governance (have been pointed out in the literature as a mitigating agent of this problem. On the other hand, other research indicates the need to be cautious when guided by the mentality of the Agency Theory, which defends it as a neutral and sufficient instrument to mitigate corruption problems.
Method: This study consists of a theoretical essay based on a bibliographical survey that exposes the themes of Corruption, Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, and Agency Theory. It surveys the different definitions, lines of research, lines of thought, supporting theories, dualities, and conflicts around the mainstream.
Results: The study's justification is centered on the perception that while studies have empirically tested the relationship between corruption and countries' accounting environments, only some have dedicated themselves to critically reflecting on the knowledge produced about this relationship.
Originality/Relevance: In the context presented, a good governance structure is recommended for effective administration and management in anti-corruption bodies. The principles of Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, which are Transparency (disclosure), Accountability, and Fairness, align with the principles of Agency Theory, which are mainly related to ethics and morality in interpersonal relationships in organizations.
Theoretical/methodological contributions: This contribution is intended to reflect on the need for organizations to contribute to the fight against corruption in their relations and to the realization of a socially responsible administration through Corporate Governance and Agency Theory, with consonance between the objectives of shareholders and agents in an intermittent fight against corruption.
References
ABILIO MARTINS, V.; JEREMIAS JUNIOR, J.; FERNANDO ENCISO, L. Conflitos de agência, Governança Corporativa e o serviço público brasileiro: um ensaio teórico. Revista de Governança Corporativa, v. 5, n. 1, 2021. DOI: 10.21434/IberoamericanJCG.v5i1.25.
ABRAMO, C. W. Corrupção no Brasil: A perspectiva do setor privado, 2003. Relatório Transparência Brasil, 2004. http://www.transparencia.org.br/docs/perspec-privado-2003.pdf, Acesso em 01/08/2015.
ALMEIDA, K., SANTOS, R. C. dos; MESQUITA, M.; LIMA, R. Conflitos de Agência e Assimetria de Informações Contábeis: Entre a Tomada de Decisão e a Gestão Corporativa. International Journal of Professional Business Review (JPBReview), 5(2), 234-255, 2020.
ARCIONI, J. M.; MESQUITA, W. A. C. de. A Responsabilidade Social nas Organizações: Percepções e Realidade. Revista Gestão & Tecnologia, v. 7, n. 2, p. 1-17, 2007
ARRUDA, G.S.; MADRUGA S. R.; FREITAS JUNIOR, N.I. A governança corporativa e a teoria da agência em consonância com a controladoria. Rev. Adm. UFSM, v. I, n. 1, p. 71-84, 2008.
BARDHAN, P. Association Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 1320-134
BAUCUS, M. S; NEAR, J. P. Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An event history analysis. Academy of Management Journal, v. 34, n 1, p. 9-36, 1991.
BAUCUS, M. S. Pressure, opportunity and predisposition: a multivariate model of corporate illegality. Journal of Management, v. 20, n. 4, p. 699-721, 1994.
BERLE JR., A. A.; MEANS, G. C. The modern corporation and private property. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.
BORINI, F. M.; GRISI, F. C. A corrupção no ambiente de negócios: survey com as micro e pequenas empresas da cidade de São Paulo. R.Adm., v.44, n.2, p.102-117, 2009.
BOWEN, H. R. Social responsibilities of the businessman. New York: Harper & Row, 1953.
BRANDOLINO, J.; LUNA, D. QUESTÕES DE DEMOCRACIA: Transformando a cultura da corrupção. Departamento de Estado dos EUA: Bureau de Programas de Informações Internacionais, 2006.
BREI, Z. A. A corrupção: causas, conseqüências e soluções para o problema. RAP, v. 30, n. 3, 103-115, 1996.
BRENNAN, N. M.; SOLOMON, J. Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 21 Iss: 7, pp.885 – 906, 2008.
BUCHANAN, James M. Rent seeking and profit seeking. In: BUCHANAN, James M.; TOLLISON, Robert D.; TULLOCK, Gordon (Ed.). Toward a theory of the rentseeking society. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1980. p. 3-15.
BUCHERONI, Carlos Alberto; et al. A Dimensão Humana na Governança Corporativa: Ensaio Teórico e Propostas Para Futuros Estudos. Rev. CCEI, v.15, n.28, p. 19-38. 2011.
CAMARGO, B. F.; BARCELLOS, B.; LINCK, I. M. D.; NEUBAUER, V. S. Contribuições da Ética para a Governança Corporativa. Revista da Universidade Vale do Rio Verde, v. 12, n. 2, p. 244-257, 2014.
CARROLL, A. B. A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social performance. Academy of Management Review, (4), 497-505, 1979.
CARROLL, A. B. The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34(4), 39-46.1991
CARROL, A. B., HOY, F. Integrating Corporate Social Policy into Strategic Management. The Journal of Business Strategy, 4(3), 48-57, 1984.
CASTILHOS, T. O. de. Assessing Legislative Innovation and its Impact on Corruption Control and Constitutional Rights: Advancements and Setbacks. Journal of Law and Corruption Review, v. 3, p. e062, 2021. DOI: 10.37497/CorruptionReview.3.2021.62.
CHENG, B., I.; SERAFEIM, G. Corporate Social Responsibility and access to Finance. Strategic Management Journal, (35), 1–23.2014.
COASE, Ronald. The nature of the firm. Economica, v. 4. p. 386-405, 1937
CODIGO PENAL BRASIL. Decreto-Lei nº 2.848 de 07.12.1940 1940, e alterações. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/Del2848compilado.htm, Acesso em 01/08/2015.
FERRARI, Vinícius Eduardo. A inconsistência teórica e empírica da hipótese central do rent seeking. Mediações, v. 16, n.1, p. 323-344, Jan./Jun. 2011.
FREEMAN, R. E. Strategic management: a stakeholder approach. Massachusetts: Sage, 1984.
GONZALEZ, R. S. Tendência mundial: governança e responsabilidade social corporativa. Relações com Investidores, n. 53, p. 15-16, jul. 2002.
GUERREIRO, M. das D.; PEREIRA, I. Responsabilidade Social das Empresas, Igualdade e Conciliação Trabalho-Família: Experiências do Prémio Igualdade é Qualidade. Lisboa: Comissão para a Igualdade no Trabalho e no Emprego, 2006.
HATCH, M. J. Organization theory: modern, symbolic and postmodern perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 63-100, 1997.
HILL, C. W. L. et al. Human Relations, v. 45, n. 10, p. 1055-1076, 1992.
HOPE, K. R. Administrative corruption and administrative reform in developing State. Corruption and Reform. v. 22l, l27-47, 1987.
HUANG, Q.; YUAN, T. Does political corruption impede firm innovation? Evidence from the United States. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56 (1), 213-248, 2021.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109019000966
HUNTINGTON, S. P. Modernization and corruption. In: Heidenheimer A. J. Political corruption readings comparative analisys. New York Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1970.
IBGC. Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa. Guia de Sustentabilidade para as Empresa. Coordenação: Carlos Eduardo Lessa Brandão e Homero Luís Santos. São Paulo: IBGC, 2007.
IBGC. Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa. Código das Melhores Práticas de Governança Corporativa. 4.ed. São Paulo: IBGC, 2009.
JENSEN, M.C, MECKLING, W.H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976.
KLITGAARD, Robert. A corrupção sob controle. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1994.
KRUEGER, A. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The American Economic Review, v. 64, n. 3, pg 291-303, 1974.
LIMA, A. A.; RIBEIRO, T. de L. S. Mapping the emergence of the theme of corruption in the area of corporate governance: a bibliometric review of the literature. Journal of Law and Corruption Review, v. 6, p. e074, 2024. DOI: 10.37497/CorruptionReview.6.2024.74.
MACLEAN, T. L. Framing and organizational misconduct: a symbolic interactionist study. Journal of Business Ethics, v. 78, n. 1/2, p. 3-16, 2008.
MAGERAKIS, E.; TZELEPIS, D. Corruption, cash holdings and firm performance: empirical evidence from an emerging market. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 24(3), 483–507, 2023. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/JAAR-11-2021-0310
MIRANDA, R. A. de; AMARAL, H. F. Governança corporativa e gestão socialmente responsável em empresas estatais, RAP, 45(4):1069-94, 2011.
NASCIMENTO, J. C. H. B.; LOURENÇO, R. L.; SAUERBRONN, F. F.; BERNARDES, J. R. Ambiente Institucional de Contabilidade, Voz e Accountability, Distância do Poder e Corrupção: uma Análise Cross Country. Advances in Scientific and Applied Accounting, 11(2), 246-266, 2018.
ORSO, L. É.; SANTOS, R. C. dos; RAUPP, F. M.; SOUSA, A. M. R. Ownership Structure and Shareholders: Perspectives on Conflict between State Participation in the Value of Companies on the Brazilian Stock Exchange - B3. Revista do CEJUR/TJSC: Prestação Jurisdicional, v. 11, p. e0400, 2023. DOI: 10.37497/revistacejur.v11i00.400.
RAUSCH, R. B.; SOARES, M. Controle social na administração pública: a importância da transparência das contas públicas para inibir a corrupção. Revista de Educação e Pesquisas em Contabilidade, v.4, n. 3, p. 23-43, 2010.
REIS, C. N. dos. A Responsabilidade Social das Empresas: O Contexto Brasileiro Em Face da Ação Consciente ou do Modernismo Do Mercado? R. Econ. Contemp., v. 11, n. 2, p. 279-305, 2007.
SANTOS, R. C.; ORSO, L. É., MACHADO, M. C. R; SOUSA, A. M. R. Foreign investors? The effects of the property structure and legal system as mechanisms of corporate governance in Brazilian regulated companies. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, v. 19, p. 1082-1116, 2019.
SANTOS, R. C. dos; SOARES, J. M. I. Ensaio Teórico sobre a Governança Corporativa em setores regulados aplicado às concessionárias de rodovias. Revista de Governança Corporativa, v. 3, n. 1, 2021. DOI: 10.21434/IberoamericanJCG.v3i1.18.
SCHNATTERLY, K. Increasing firm value through detection and prevention. Strategic Management Journal, v. 24, n. 7, p. 587-614, 2003.
SCHWARTZ, M. S., CARROLL, A. B. Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain Approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(4), 503-530, 2003.
SCHWARTZ, M. S., CARROLL, A. B. Integrating and unifying competing and complementary frameworks: the search for a common core in the business and society field. Business & Society, 20(10), 1-39, 2007.
SIFFERT Filho, N. Governança Corporativa: Padrões Internacionais e Evidências Empíricas no Brasil nos Anos 90. Revista BNDES n.9, 1998.
SILVA, A. M. C. da; BRAGA, E. C.; LAURENCEL, L. da C. A Corrupção em uma Abordagem Econômico-Contábil e o Auxílio da Auditoria como Ferramenta de Combate. Revista Contabilidade Vista & Revista, v. 20, n. 1, p. 95-117, 2009.
SILVA, M. F. G. Corrupção e desempenho econômicos. Os Custos da Corrupção. Cadernos Adenauer, Nº 10, 2000.
SILVA, M. F. G. A economia política da corrupção. Transparência Brasil, São Paulo, 2001.
STRANDBERG, Coro. The convergence of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: thought-leaders study. Burnaby, 2005
TANZI, V. Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures. International Monetary Fund, p. 559-594, 45, 1998.
TRAN, Q. T. Corruption and corporate risk-taking: evidence from emerging markets. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 17(5), p. 1238-1255, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-08-2019-0602
TRAN, Q. T. Corruption and corporate cash holdings: international evidence. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 54, 100611, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2019.100611
TULLOCK, G. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, Oxford, v. 5, p. 224-230, 1967. [Reimpresso em TOLLISON, Robert D.; CONGLETON, Roger D. (Ed.). The economic analysis of rent seeking. Aldershoot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1995].
VU, H.; VAN, T.; T. Q.; NGUYEN, T. V.; LIM, S. Corruption, Types of Corruption and Firm Financial Performance: New Evidence from a Transitional Economy. Journal of Business Ethics, 148(4), 847–858, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3016-y
XU, H.; DAO, M.; WU, J. The effect of local political corruption on earnings quality. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 53, 551-574, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0758-x
WADA, A. A. D. L. Analysis of the Anti-Corruption Law: Necessity, Applicability, and Criticisms. Journal of Law and Corruption Review, v. 1, p. e058, 2019. DOI: 10.37497/CorruptionReview.1.2019.58.
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:
1. Authors who publish in this journal agree to the following terms: the author(s) authorize(s) the publication of the text in the journal;
2. The author(s) ensure(s) that the contribution is original and unpublished and that it is not in the process of evaluation by another journal;
3. The journal is not responsible for the views, ideas and concepts presented in articles, and these are the sole responsibility of the author(s);
4. The publishers reserve the right to make textual adjustments and adapt texts to meet with publication standards.
5. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal the right to first publication, with the work simultaneously licensed under the Creative Commons Atribuição NãoComercial 4.0 internacional, which allows the work to be shared with recognized authorship and initial publication in this journal.
6. Authors are allowed to assume additional contracts separately, for non-exclusive distribution of the version of the work published in this journal (e.g. publish in institutional repository or as a book chapter), with recognition of authorship and initial publication in this journal.
7. Authors are allowed and are encouraged to publish and distribute their work online (e.g. in institutional repositories or on a personal web page) at any point before or during the editorial process, as this can generate positive effects, as well as increase the impact and citations of the published work (see the effect of Free Access) at http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html
• 8. Authors are able to use ORCID is a system of identification for authors. An ORCID identifier is unique to an individual and acts as a persistent digital identifier to ensure that authors (particularly those with relatively common names) can be distinguished and their work properly attributed.