Keywords
Legislação civil
Dividendos
Modelo de resultado
Modelo de substituição
How to Cite
Abstract
Este artigo investiga os efeitos dos mecanismos de proteção ao credor sobre as políticas corporativas de dividendos, à luz dos modelos de agência de resultado e de substituição. Os resultados empíricos estão baseados em dados de 6.191 empresas, em 27 países de direito civil, durante o período de 2008 a 2017. Para dar suporte às hipóteses formuladas, são apresentadas estatísticas resumidas, regressões Tobit e o Método Generalizado de Momentos (GMM). Os resultados sugerem que, em países de origem civil, a alta proteção ao credor reduz os dividendos de empresas com maiores oportunidades de investimento. Inversamente, quando da baixa proteção à dívida, as empresas pagam mais dividendos. Deste modo, é possível concluir que, em países de origem civil, sob a perspectiva do credor, as políticas de dividendos não são consistentes com os modelos de resultado e de substituição.
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